The Democratic People\u27s Republic of Korea\u27s Strategy for Possession of Nuclear Weapons(Abstract) by 宮本 悟
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's
Strategy for Possession of Nuclear
Weapons(Abstract)
journal or
publication title
Seigakuin University General Research
Institute Bulletin
number No.61
page range 5-5
year 2016-03
URL http://id.nii.ac.jp/1477/00001975/
Abstract
Abstract
The Democratic People s Republic of Korea s Strategy
for Possession of Nuclear Weapons
Satoru Miyamoto
This paper discusses why nuclear development countries may choose 
to change their strategies for possession of nuclear weapons, and why the 
Democratic People s Republic of Korea (DPRK) chose the strategy of declaring 
their possession of nuclear weapons, abandoning their strategy of keeping vague 
their possession of nuclear weapons.
in terms of a threefold choice: visible, opaque or abandoned, introducing the 
concept proposed by Avner Cohen and Benjamin Frankel. However, Cohen 
and Frankel failed to explain the variables that affect a country s strategy for 
possession of nuclear weapons. Thus I proposed the hypothesis of three threat 
levels: 1) threat from a nuclear country, 2) threat from a non-nuclear country or 
one suspected of possessing nuclear weapons, and 3) no adversary country, i.e. 
 non-threat,  introducing the theory of T.V. Paul, and tested it by considering 
the cases of eighteen countries known as nuclear development countries. 
Furthermore, I examined the causal relation between strategies chosen and the 
type of political regime: totalitarian, authoritarian or democratic. I had assumed 
that totalitarian and authoritarian countries would choose visible or opaque strat-
egies and that democratic countries would not.
From what has been discussed above, it might be said that threat levels 
than differences of political regime. This conclusion also shows that international 
weapons than do domestic politics. 
